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Whether referred to as "plea bargaining," "plea negotiations," "plea
discussions," or "copping a plea," the guilty plea, and not the trial process,
accounts for 90 percent of the criminal convictions in the United States.,
Although the process of pleading guilty in return for concessions from
either the prosecutor or the presiding judge is not without its critics,2 a
growing awareness of the guilty plea's practical importance in the effort
to achieve a more equitable and expeditious judicial system has devel-
oped. 3
Significantly, in the recent decision People v. Selikof[,' the New York
Court of Appeals formally placed its imprimatur on the practice of plea
bargaining, adding its prestige to the long list of courts and commentators
who have recognized the value of the guilty plea.5 To properly assess the
impact of the Selikoff decision, however, it is necessary first to examine
* This case comment is a student work prepared by John F. Byrne, a member of the ST.
JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS 4 (1967). While more recent, national estimates have not been made
available, in 1973 80% of all homicide indictments in New York City were disposed of by
guilty pleas, usually to the reduced count of manslaughter. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1975, at 39,
col. 4.
1 See, e.g., Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956) (plea bargaining erodes respect for the criminal justice system);
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970) (plea bargain-
ing inherently destructive of the values of trial process).
I See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette,
395 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 892 (1968).
35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91
Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970); State v. Cato, 29 Conn. Supp. 443, 290 A.2d 901 (Super. Ct. 1972);
Commonwealth v. Marsh, 448 Pa. 292, 293 A.2d 57 (1972); White, A Proposal for Reform of
the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1970) [hereinafter cited as White];
Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 771 (1973).
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the elements, benefits, and shortcomings of plea bargaining as it presently
exists.'
THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS
Ostensibly, the plea bargain merely consists of a defendant's entry of
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in exchange for prosecutorial or judicial
concessions.7 Yet the vagaries of motivation and the variety of induce-
' The concept of negotiated justice is by no means a novel one. See generally Comment, The
Plea Bargain in Historical Perspective, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 499 (1973). The birth of plea
bargaining can be traced to the day when an aggrieved member of a tribal society opted to
accept monetary payment in lieu of his traditional right of revenge. See R. CHERRY, LECTURES
ON THE GROWTH OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ANCIENT COMMUNITIES 8-10 (1890). The author notes:
It lay entirely in the discretion of the injured person whether he would accept pecuni-
ary satisfaction or wreak his revenge on the wrongdoer. And the latter, if he were strong
enough, could safely defy his enemy and refuse to give any satisfaction. It was alto-
gether a matter of private bargaining; the injured man. . . according to the fierceness
of his anger, exacting whatever sum he could from the wrongdoer.
Id. at 10.
The earliest American decision dealing with the guilty plea exhibited a marked antipathy
toward any bargaining in the criminal process. Although prior negotiation between the defen-
dant and court officials was never mentioned, the court, in Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass.
95 (1804), meticulously reviewed the attending circumstances before accepting the plea to
ensure that no inducements had been offered to secure it.
In the afternoon of the same day, the prisoner was again set to the bar, and the
indictment for murder was once more read to him; he again pleaded guilty. Upon
which the Court examined, under oath, the sheriff, the jailer, and the justice . . . as
to the sanity of the prisoner; and whether there had not been tampering with him,
either by promises, persuasion, or hopes of pardon, if he would plead guilty. On a very
full inquiry, nothing of that kind appearing . . . the clerk was directed to record the
plea on both indictments.
Id. at 96 (emphasis in original).
Whatever the initial antipathy toward the guilty plea, it was clear that plea bargaining played
an integral role in the evolution of the modern criminal justice system. Cf. Miller, The
Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927). It was not until the early 1920's,
however, that a detailed empirical study documented precisely how integral that role had
been. Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 96, 115 (1928). In 1925, for example, 88%
of all convictions in New York City were the result of guilty pleas, as were 85% in Chicago,
86% in Cleveland, 90% in Minneapolis, and 81% in Los Angeles. Id. at 105.
Even then, plea bargaining was criticized. One court noted:
It is a matter of common knowledge that district attorneys frequently bargain with
those charged with crime, and either under promise of immunity or acceptance of a
plea of lesser degree than that for which the defendant was indicted, those deserving
of extreme punishment are permitted to escape with a suspended sentence or with
punishment all too inadequate for the crime committed. We deplore the tendency of
some district attorneys, following the course of least resistance, thus to relax the rigid
enforcement of our penal statutes.
People v. Gowasky, 219 App. Div. 19, 24, 219 N.Y.S. 373, 379 (1st Dep't 1926), afj'd, 244 N.Y.
451, 155 N.E. 737 (1927). Clearly, this admonition has been ignored.
' See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL (1966) [hereinafter cited as NEWMAN]; Goldfluss, Status of Plea Bargaining - A View
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ments which prompt the plea's entry8 make the bargaining process consid-
erably more complex than its rather straightforward definition.
When confronted with an indictment or information, the primary
objective of any bargaining defendant is to secure relief from the possible
imposition of the maximum sentence for the crime charged." Rather than
risk or await disposition at trial, the accused, in return for pleading guilty,
seeks a promise from the prosecutor to dismiss additional charges,"0 permit
pleading to a lesser included offense," recommend lenient sentencing, 2 or
simply not take a position on sentencing.' 3 In many instances, however, the
defendant will refuse to plead to a lesser offense until his attorney directly,
yet discreetly, makes inquiry of the judge himself as to the sentencing
concessions arising from the guilty plea.'4
from the Bench, 173 N.Y.L.J. 17, Jan. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Goldfluss];
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CI. L. REV. 50 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Alschuler]; Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure
Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Guilty Plea Bargaining].
See text accompanying notes 35-40 infra.
See Enker, Prospectives on Plea Bargaining, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 110 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Enker]; Gallagher, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Search
for New Standards, 9 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 29, 33 & n.28 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Gallagher]; White, supra note 5, at 440.
o See NEWMAN, supra note 7, at 78-104; Enker, supra note 9, at 108-10; State v. Thomas, 61
N.J. 314, 294 A.2d 57 (1972) (two counts of a three-count indictment dropped); Austin v.
State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971) (no prosecution of a subsequent, uncharged
robbery offense).
" See, e.g., People v. White, 5 Ill. App. 3d 205, 282 N.E.2d 467 (3d Dist. 1972) (plea to
voluntary manslaughter and aggravated battery rather than to murder and voluntary man-
slaughter); People v. Clairborne, 29 N.Y.2d 950, 280 N.E.2d 366, 329 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1972)
(mem.) (plea to "falsely reporting an incident," an offense, rather than to the crime charged,
"criminal solicitation").
'2 See, e.g., Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968);
Schwerm v. State, 288 Minn. 488, 181 N.W.2d 867 (1970); NEWMAN, supra note 7, at 78-104.
13 See, e.g., People v. Barajas, 26 Cal. App. 3d 932, 103 Cal. Rptr. 405 (4th Dist. 1972)
(prosecutor to remain silent at sentencing); Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 276
A.2d 526 (1971) (prosecutor not to seek death penalty). See generally Alschuler, supra note
7, at 58-85.
" In New York, judges regularly participate in plea negotiations and often suggest appropri-
ate plea bargains. White, supra note 5, at 488. Goldfluss, a judge of the New York City
Criminal Court, discusses the "practical everyday workings of the plea bargaining process"
as follows:
Defense counsel approaches the Bench with the prosecutor and discussion is held
concerning possible disposition. Let us assume that the judge is merely a witness to
this conversation, and that the parties tentatively agree to a lesser plea. It is then that
defense counsel will turn to the judge and inquire, most discreetly, of course, what His
Honor has in mind for a sentence.
Certainly, counsel was not hired by the defendant to obtain the maximum sen-
tence under the reduced plea-that result could be accomplished by the defendant
without the aid of counsel. The fact of the matter is that before counsel returns to the
RATIONAL PLEA BARGAINING
A guilty plea is in and of itself a conviction.'5 Thus, the defendant who
pleads guilty effectively waives such fundamental constitutional rights as
the presumption of innocence, the right to trial by jury, the right to remain
silent, and the right to confront one's accusers.'" Moreover, a prosecutor
may further require that the defendant expressly waive a procedural rem-
edy such as a suppression hearing or an appeal," or render information or
additional assistance to the state.' 8
Whatever the specific concessions and concomitant waivers involved,
it is clear that plea bargaining is encouraged. Indeed, New York courts
have condoned the acceptance of guilty pleas addressed both to nonexis-
tent offenses and to crimes which the defendant concededly did not com-
mit.'9 A striking example of such condonation can be found in People v.
Foster,° where the court accepted a plea of guilty to the fictitious crime of
"attempted manslaughter." The court of appeals has frankly admitted
that after plea bargaining, "the factual basis of the crime confessed can
ordinarily only be found in the language of the plea."2'
The Bargain in Plea Bargaining
It has been suggested that the plea bargaining process serves to relieve
defendant with the terms of the offer, he wants all eventualities spelled out. The
defendant's main consideration is not the statutory classification of his plea but the
time, or the scope of time, that he may be in durance vile. So, if counsel attempts to
exact a commitment from the judge, there is nothing presumptuous or contemptuous
about such effort. It is exactly what he should do if he is to competently represent his
client.
Goldfluss, supra note 7, at 4, col. 3.
" Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); accord, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242 (1969).
s The Supreme Court has noted that:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a
plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First is the privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the
states by reason of the Fourteenth. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Third is the
right to confront one's accusers.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969) (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., People v. Esajerre, 35 N.Y.2d 463, 323 N.E.2d 175, 363 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1974)
(waiver of right to hearing on suppression of evidence); Commonwealth v. Marsh, 448 Pa.
292, 293 A.2d 57 (1972) (foregoing of further appeals).
" See, e.g., United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969) (defendant was required
to render additional information); Commonwealth v. Todd, 186 Pa. Super. 272, 142 A.2d 174
(1958) (defendant was required to testify as a witness for the state).
'1 See, e.g., People v. Clairborne, 29 N.Y.2d 950, 280 N.E.2d 366, 329 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1972)
(mem.); People v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 269 N.E.2d 794, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1971).
19 N.Y.2d 150, 225 N.E.2d 200, 278 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1967).
ii People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d 511, 516, 166 N.E.2d 684, 686, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677 (1960).
But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (factual basis for crime charged required).
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litigants of the inevitable risks of trial," hastens the offender along the road
to rehabilitation,23 permits an exchange of leniency for information and
assistance, 4 and enables the court to individualize the sentencing proc-
ess." Certainly, the discretion exhibited by courts and prosecutors in
accepting guilty pleas to lesser offenses may often be more equitable than
a strict application of the criminal statutes.26 Moreover, the information
gleaned from plea discussions may supply insight into mitigating circum-
stances concerning the defendant which might otherwise go undetected.
The advantage of plea bargaining to the individual defendant or pros-
ecutor is overshadowed by its importance to the criminal justice system.
In 1970, grand juries in New York sent approximately 32,000 felony indict-
ments to courts of higher criminal jurisdiction; yet, under ideal circum-
stances, the available judges and prosecutors could only handle a maxi-
mum of 4,000 to 5,000 felony trials a year.2 In 1973, only 11 percent of the
homicide indictments issued in New York City were resolved by trials and
jury verdicts.2 8 It would be an understatement to note that guilty pleas
serve to relieve court calendar congestion.29 Indeed, Chief Judge Breitel,
writing for the court in Selikoff, remarked that, "in budget-starved urban
criminal courts, the negotiated plea literally staves off collapse of the law
enforcement system, not just as to the courts but also to local detention
facilities."3" In short, absent massive funding for additional court facilities
n See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967); Alschuler, supra note 7, at 50-85.
2 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
2' See, e.g., People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal. 2d 110, 403 P.2d 429, 45 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965) (en
banc) (probation rather than incarceration recommended in return for participation in solv-
ing a crime); Commonwealth v. Todd, 186 Pa. Super. 272, 142 A.2d 174 (1958) (defendant
was promised concurrent rather than consecutive sentences in'return for testimony as a
witness for the state).
,1 See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 605, 477 P.2d 409, 414, 19 Cal. Rptr. 385, 390 (1970) (en
banc); NEWMAN, supra note 7, at 112-13.
" See Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 431-32 (1959).
The author remarks:
Criminal conduct must be described in general terms. The rules must sweep together
identical acts with their markedly different actors amid infinitely variable circumstan-
ces. . . .There is the much maligned, but almost universally used, discretion by
prosecutors and courts in accepting lesser pleas. . . .It is sometimes a finer adjust-
ment to the particular crime and offender than the straight application of the rules of
law would permit.
Id. See also NEWMAN, supra note 7, at 112-29.
21 1972-73 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SELECT COMM. ON CRIME, ITS CAUSES, CONTROL &
EFFECT ON SOCIETY 14.
28 N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1975, at 39, col. 4. See note 1 supra.
" See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967).
35 N.Y.2d at 223, 318 N.E.2d at 788, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
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and personnel,3 the primary advantage of plea bargaining is that it does
in fact exist.
Shortcomings of the Bargaining Process
Unfortunately, the plea bargaining process is often tainted by the
arbitrary actions of the prosecutor and influenced by the circumstances
surrounding the defendant. Since a guilty plea is a conviction, the prosecu-
tor knows he can generate a desirably high conviction rate without risking
a trial.3 2 Thus, in all likelihood the prosecutor will first determine the
strength of the state's case and then proceed accordingly. 31
Rather than risk the possibility of defeat in the courtroom, the prose-
cutor may offer more liberal concessions to secure a conviction when the
evidence at his disposal indicates his case is "weak." He may also decide
to overcharge the defendant in an effort to induce plea bargaining. Indeed,
some prosecutors have been accused of specifically drafting indictments
with eventual plea arrangements in mind.3 4 When a defendant is facing a
10-count indictment, a prosecutor's offer to accept a guilty plea to a single,
lesser count may seem like a true concession rather than a routine, admin-
istrative reduction. While a prosecutor's discretion is an integral part of
the criminal justice system, his arbitrary power to induce the plea bargain
can frustrate the ends of justice if used improperly.
A prosecutor's inducements are likely to vary with the relative position
of the defendant. As Professor White's study of plea bargaining in Phila-
delphia and New York indicates, the prosecutor's bargaining position is
definitely enhanced when the defendant is in custody. 3 The indigent de-
fendant, unable to raise bail or hire private counsel, often faces lengthy
a One commentator has noted:
Even if the money were readily available, it would still not be clear that we could call
upon sufficient numbers of competent personnel. A lowering of standards in order to
man the store adequately may well result in poorer justice. It may also divert both
funds and personnel from other segments of the criminal process, such as corrections
work, where they are arguably needed.
Enker, supra note 9, at 112.
32 See note 22 supra. One New York attorney has remarked, "Prosecutors ... hate to have
a defeat on their record. When they have a weak case, they'll go to great lengths to avoid a
trial." White, supra note 5, at 488, quoting Interview with Martin Erdman, New York Legal
Aid Society, in New York City, April 28, 1970.
1 For a discussion of the inordinate concern of prosecutors with their conviction rate and their
willingness to negotiate a weak case see Alschuler, supra note 7, at 58-85. See also White,
supra note 5, at 445, 448; Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 292 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Restructuring the Plea Bargain].
4 Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note 7, at 886. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 85-105;
Restructuring the Plea Bargain, supra note 33, at 293-94.
11 Professor White has remarked that "an incarcerated defendant, frightened and demoral-
ized by the prospect of an indefinite period of confinement, may be willing to enter a plea
and accept a fixed period of imprisonment." White, supra note 5, at 444.
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delays in awaiting trial.3" From this defendant's viewpoint, both the safe-
guarding of constitutional rights and a day in court are less compelling
than an offer of release from the local house of detention. Such a defendant
will invariably find the prosecutor's offer to recommend a sentence com-
mensurate with or including the time spent in prison awaiting trial an
appealing one.
Conversely, a defendant free on bail is less likely to enter a plea and
thereby lose his freedom without winning greater concessions from the
prosecutor. 7 The unincarcerated defendant, with sufficient resources to
raise bail and hire private counsel, can literally afford to delay and com-
mand the best "price" for his guilty plea. 38 The defendant who is well
versed in the criminal process can utilize his knowledge of the pressure on
prosecutors and courts to dispose of cases quickly to gain a better bargain.
Advocates of plea bargaining point to the recording of convictions, the
meting out of punishment to offenders, and the easing of the burden on
courts as justification, if not an apology, for the criminal justice system's
heavy reliance on the guilty plea. Yet plea bargaining fails miserably when
a defendant is charged with counts so vacuous that a prosecutor would
have had to drop them at trial,39 or when a defendant agrees to a sentence
identical to the penalty customarily prescribed upon a full trial convic-
tion.40 In both instances, the defendant has waived his constitutional rights
and has received nothing in exchange.
Neither the state nor the accused actually benefits when, through fear,
inducement, or doubt, defendants are forced to plead guilty to crimes
which they simply did not commit." Similarly, when an accused success-
fully maneuvers the plea bargaining process to his own advantage, the
defendant gets the best of the bargain at the expense of the general public's
safety and welfare.42 Plea bargaining, then, is by no means a solution to
the problem of our overburdened trial courts.
See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
31 See Restructuring the Plea Bargain, supra note 33, at 294-95. The bailed defendant can
often profit by delay since, over a period of time, memories may fade, witnesses may become
unavailable, and the defendant may develop a record of good behavior which can help him
at sentencing. White, supra note 5, at 444-45.
See note 37 supra.
This inequity is even more reprehensible if a defendant who is likely to be acquitted on
trial is subtly coerced into accepting such an arrangement. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at
60-61; Comment, Official Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace,
32 U. Cm. L. REV. 167, 177 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Official Inducements to Plead
Guilty].
40 See Gallagher, supra note 9, at 33-38. In United States v. Jasper, 481 F.2d 976 (3d Cir.
1973), the court indicated that failure to inform the defendant as to the absence of a sentenc-
ing differential upon conviction at trial constituted grounds for invalidating a guilty plea.
1' See Steel, The Losers in Plea Bargaining, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1975, at 25, col. 3; Alschu-
ler, supra note 7, at 60-61; White, supra note 5, at 451-52.
" See Interview with Mario Merola, District Attorney, Bronx County, New York City, in N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1975, at 39, col. 6; NEWMAN, supra note 7, at 46; Restructuring the Plea
RATIONAL PLEA BARGAINING
PLEA BARGAINING AND THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
It is significant that in combining a trilogy of cases for single consider-
ation, the Selikoff court chose to address itself to the goals, administration,
and enforcement of the plea bargaining process instead of focusing on the
disposition of the individual appeals. Most importantly, the Selikoff court
stressed both the value of the court record and the role of the judge in the
acceptance of guilty pleas. It is this recognition of the inviolability of the
record of proceedings and the necessity of judicial participation in plea
bargaining from which the Selikoff decision draws its strength-and, per-
haps, its inherent weakness.
In 1970, Sheldon Selikoff was facing 38 counts of larceny in 3 indict-
ments arising out of a real estate swindle4" as well as a fourth indictment
charging him with obscenity in the second degree. 4 After professing his
innocence for nearly two years, on May 12, 1972, in the middle of his trial,
Selikoff moved to withdraw his plea of not guilty. He approached the
bench with counsel to offer a plea of guilty to one count of grand larceny
in the second degree and obscenity in the second degree in full satisfaction
of all four indictments.
The second defendant, Campbell, was being held on a prosecutor's
information charging him with misdemeanor drug offenses."5 At his ar-
raignment, after a discussion between his attorney and the prosecutor,
Campbell entered a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of loitering for the
purpose of using or possessing a dangerous drug."
In 1971, defendant Davidson was charged with murder and an unre-
lated larceny for which he faced a possible sentence upon conviction of
from 15 years to life imprisonment. After a detailed discussion before the
arraigning court, Davidson pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the second
Bargain, supra note 33, at 294-95. Unfortunately, the ideal solution is as illusory as it is
obvious.
If we had more trial parts courtrooms [sic], the balance would then tip in favor of
the district attorneys . . . . The opportunity of trial would lead to stiffer sentences
and, at the same time, give an innocent defendant his rightful day in court.
Interview with Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York County, New York City
in N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1975, at 39, col. 6. Courtrooms and the funds to staff them, however,
may not offer the solution. See note 31 supra.
,3 This appears to be an example of what one author has described as "horizontal overcharg-
ing," i.e., charging a defendant with several counts of the same offense in an effort to induce
a plea bargain. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 87. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
11 35 N.Y.2d at 235, 318 N.E.2d at 789, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
" Campbell was initially held on charges of felony drug possession. After a preliminary
hearing, however, the grand jury directed that only a misdemeanor information be filed. 35
N.Y.2d at 235, 318 N.E.2d at 790, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
48 The reduced loitering charge constitutes a class B misdemeanor, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.36
(McKinney Supp. 1974), whereas possession constitutes a class A misdemeanor, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 220.03 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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degree in full satisfaction of both charges. 7 Rather than impose the maxi-
mum sentence of 15 years, the judge ordered the defendant imprisoned for
no more than from 3 to 10 years. Three separate defendants; three adjudi-
cations without the need for jury trials; three convictions. Clearly, plea
bargaining had been at work. Nevertheless, all three defendants were now
before the New York Court of Appeals. Something had soured the "bar-
gain."
People v. Selikoff
Upon Selikoff's entry of a plea of guilty to grand larceny and obscen-
ity, both in the second degree, Judge Burchell of the Westchester County
Court made the statement that incarceration would not be required of the
defendant." Nonetheless, three months later when the defendant returned
before Judge Burchell for sentencing, the court felt that it could not "in
good conscience and in the interests of justice keep the promise here to no
incarceration."' 9 As the judge indicated, in the interim he had presided
over the trial of Selikoff's original codefendant and learned that Selikoff's
role in the larceny was more extensive than presumed at the arraignment
proceeding. 0 After refusing an offer to withdraw his plea, the defendant
was sentenced to a maximum of five years imprisonment as well as a fine.
In affirming the decision of the appellate division to let stand the
judgment of conviction,5 the court of appeals examined the record of pro-
ceedings, the sentencing power of the court, and the remedies available to
the defendant. Although the record unambiguously showed that an uncon-
35 N.Y.2d at 237, 318 N.E.2d at 790-91, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
People v. Selikoff, 41 App. Div. 2d 376, 377, 343 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd,
35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974). Specifically, Judge Burchell stated:
At this point . . .I would like to place on the record, Sheldon Selikoff, I have had a
number of conferences with your attorney and with representatives of the District
Attorney's Office with regard to the cases against you. Based upon the results of the
conferences and conversations and the fact and representation made to the court, I
indicated to the attorney and I am now indicating to you that in my opinion in the
interest of justice that no incarceration of you is required and based upon this plea as
to what other sentence I shall impose, I do not know and I make no promises.
41 App. Div. 2d at 377, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
It seems rather clear that the reference to "what other sentence" related to the obscenity
charge and the possibility of the imposition of a fine. See id. at 380, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 392
(Gulotta, J., dissenting).
11 41 App. Div. 2d at 378, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
0 The record of the proceeding in the Westchester County Court, reprinted by the Appellate
Division in their decision, makes no mention of precisely what Selikoffs involvement was. It
seems inconceivable, however, that the prosecutor was unaware of Selikoff's role at the time
the bargain was made and nonetheless acquiesced in a sentence of no incarceration. See id.
at 377-78, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 389-90.
1 Id. at 376, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
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ditional promise had been made,52 the court of appeals found that Judge
Burchell had impliedly conditioned his promise of no incarceration upon
the information and disclosures which had been made known to him up
to that point. 51 Since the original recommendation was based upon the
belief that the defendant was minimally involved in the real estate scheme,
the sentencing judge was deemed correct in refusing to execute the promise
and justified in merely permitting Selikoff to withdraw his plea. 5
Ironically, both the court of appeals and the defendant relied upon
Santobello v. New York55 to support their respective positions. The
Santobello decision concerned the plight of a defendant who had plea
bargained with the prosecutor's office and was promised that if he would
plead guilty to a lesser included offense, no recommendation as to sentence
would be made.5 1 Upon sentencing, however, a prosecutor other than the
one with whom the negotiations had been conducted appeared and recom-
mended that the maximum sentence be imposed.5 7 Insisting that a promise
had been broken, Santobello sought to withdraw his plea. In reversing the
state courts' denial of the request, the Supreme Court of the United States
noted that
[t]his phase of the process of criminal justice, [plea bargaining] and the
adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended
by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circum-
stances. Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is that when a
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecu-
tor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such
promise must be fulfilled.58
' See note 48 supra. As the lone dissenter in the Appellate Division remarked, "the record
incontrovertibly shows an unconditional promise by the Judge that no jail sentence would
be imposed." 41 App. Div. 2d at 380, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (Gulotta, J., dissenting).
' 35 N.Y.2d at 238, 318 N.E.2d at 791, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
Id. The court partially relied upon the requirements of N.Y. CRIM. PRo. LAW § 390.20
(McKinney 1971). This statute "makes it explicit that the court cannot impose sentence
until it has a written report on a presentence investigation." People v. Aiss, 29 N.Y.2d 403,
405, 278 N.E.2d 647, 328 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (1972).
- 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
' Originally indicted on two felony counts, promoting gambling and possession of gambling
records in the first degree, Santobello finally pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charge of
possession of gambling records in the second degree. Id. at 258.
17 Id. at 259. Furthermore, the sentencing judge was apparently unconcerned with the weight
to be given to any prosecutorial recommendation:
Mr. Aronstein [defense counsel], I am not at all influenced by what the District
Attorney says .... It doesn't make a particle of difference what the District Attorney
says he will do, or what he doesn't do.
I have here, Mr. Aronstein, a probation report. I have here a history of a long, long
serious criminal record.
Id. at 259.
" Id. at 262.
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Thus, the prosecutor's failure to execute his promise invalidated the guilty
plea induced by such promise. The Supreme Court then remanded the case
to the state court to decide whether to allow the defendant to withdraw
his plea, or, in the alternative, to fulfill the aborted bargain by remanding
the proceedings for resentence before a different judge without a prosecu-
tor's sentence recommendation.59 The New York Appellate Division chose
the latter alternative. 0
Selikoff's position appeared analogous to Santobello's. Selikoff
pleaded guilty in return for a promise of no incarceration; Santobello, for
a promise of no sentence recommendation. One relied upon the word of the
judge; the other upon the representations of the prosecutor. Both had been
given their promises before judicial receipt of a presentence report. More-
over, prior to the acceptance of his plea and the making of the promise,
Selikoff had fully discussed his participation in the crimes charged and
admitted all the facts pointing to his culpability.6' Since mere withdrawal
of his plea would not return him to the status quo ante,"2 Selikoff de-
manded that which Santobello ultimately received-specific performance
of his promise. 3
While conceding the analogy, the Selikoff court pointed out that the
Santobello decision, requiring either withdrawal of the plea or specific
performance of the promise, indicated no preference for one course over the
other. Since the option rested within the discretion of the sentencing
court, the court reasoned that Judge Burchell was justified in recanting the
s' Id. at 263.
People v. Santobello, 39 App. Div. 2d 654, 331 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1st Dep't 1972).
, See note 48 supra and note 62 infra.
12 The Court of Appeals remarked that Selikoff had not changed his position, 35 N.Y.2d at
239, 318 N.E.2d at 792, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 634; nonetheless, Judge Gulotta had more fully
explained that
returning to the status quo ante is impossible in this case where codefendants of this
defendant have been tried and acquitted in the interim and the defendant himself has
waived his constitutional right against self incrimination and has made a full disclo-
sure of his involvement in the crime to the prosecuting authorities .... The record
shows that immediately prior to acceptance of the plea and the making of the promise
there was a full discussion of the defendant's participation in the crimes charged....
[H]e at that time and subsequently laid bare all the facts pointing to his culpability.
41 App. Div. 2d 376, 381, 343 N.Y.S.2d 387, 393 (Gulotta, J., dissenting).
63 35 N.Y.2d at 235, 318 N.E.2d at 790, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 631. The Selikoff court rejected out
of hand the defendant's alternative theory that specific performance of the bargain should
be granted on the basis of commercial contract law. Id. at 238, 318 N.E.2d at 791-92, 360
N.Y.S.2d at 633-34. For a discussion of the contract theory as applied to plea bargaining see
Gallagher, supra note 9, at 45-48.
1, 35 N.Y.2d at 239, 318 N.E.2d at 792, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 634. The court itself noted, however,
that specific performance of a plea bargain has been granted in New York when a prosecutor's
case was prejudiced by disclosure or delay. Id. at 239-40, 318 N.E.2d at 792, 360 N.Y.S.2d at
634-35. See, e.g., People v. Esposito, 32 N.Y.2d 921, 347 N.E.2d 438, 347 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1973)
(mem.); People v. Chadwick, 33 App. Div. 2d 687, 306 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.).
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promise and allowing Selikoff to choose either withdrawal of the plea or
the imposition of the five-year prison sentence. Since the required sentenc-
ing report did not appear to reveal the extent of Selikoff's involvement in
the larceny" and the information gathered by Judge Burchell between
arraignment and sentencing was purely fortuitous," it can be argued that
Selikoff would never have entered a guilty plea had he known of the possi-
bility of his eventual sentence. Nevertheless, the court of appeals firmly
upheld the trial judge's discretion to condition a promise on information
then known, and later elect a remedy should additional information render
the promise undeliverable.
People v. Campbell
When defendant Campbell entered his guilty plea before Judge Tyler
in the New York City Criminal Court, the prosecutor, as promised, recom-
mended that no prison sentence be imposed upon Campbell's conviction
for loitering. The pleading court then addressed the defendant and asked
whether there were any additional promises made which may have induced
the plea. Both Campbell and the prosecutor answered in the negative.
Campbell also indicated his full awareness that the prosecutor's recom-
mendation of no incarceration was purely advisory and not binding on the
court.
Neither the defendant nor the prosecutor revealed to the court their
private agreement that should sentence be imposed, the defendant would
be permitted to withdraw his plea. On sentencing, Campbell was advised
that he would have to serve a three-month prison term. Although the
prosecutor and the defendant immediately informed the court of the hith-
erto undisclosed promise, their protestations went unheeded. Interestingly,
Campbell, like Selikoff, unsuccessfully turned to the Santobello decision
for support. The court of appeals, however, failed to see the analogy and
distinguished the two cases by pointing out that the prosecutor in
Campbell lacked the requisite power, possessed by the Santobello prosecu-
tor, to offer the promise made.
There was no doubt that the prosecutor had in fact made the promise,
and little doubt that Campbell had relied upon it. Hence, defendant
11 See note 54 supra. Judge Burchell simply alluded to the fact that Selikoff had insisted on
his innocence: "Furthermore, it appears from your pre-sentence report filed by the Probation
Department that you deny any participation in any fraud by which sums of money were
extracted from money lenders." 41 App. Div. 2d 376, 378, 343 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (2d Dep't
1973).
11 Presumably, the judge would never have learned of the nature of Selikoff's involvement
had he not presided at the trial of Selikoff's codefendant since neither the prosecution nor
the pre-sentence report had informed him of such involvement. Furthermore, the "knowl-
edge" gleaned by the judge at such trial may be suspect in that Selikoff was unable to
confront or cross-examine his accusers. Id. at 380, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (Gulotta, J., dissent-
ing).
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argued that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea since the promise
went unfulfilled." The Selikoff court rejected this line of reasoning, holding
that "the prosecutor, without authority, promised that which he could not
legally perform and the defendant, therefore, could not as a matter of law,
rely on that promise."68
By refusing to recognize the private agreement between the prosecutor
and the defendant, the court of appeals clearly established the importance
of the record of proceedings to the plea bargaining process and unmistak-
ably emphasized the integral role played by the judge in these proceed-
ings." No subterfuge, however slight, was to be tolerated when a defendant
entered a plea of guilty before the court as a result of negotiations with the
prosecutor. Advising Campbell to seek relief in a different proceeding for
any injustice caused by the prosecutor, 0 the Selikoff court would not per-
", A further distinction between the two cases can be drawn. While Campbell's prosecutor
attempted to fulfill his promise by informing the court of the agreement on withdrawal of
the plea, Santobello's second prosecutor clearly ignored the original promise that no sentence
recommendation would be offered. See 404 U.S. at 259, 262.
11 35 N.Y.2d at 241, 318 N.E.2d at 793, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 636. Nonetheless, other courts,
apparently more concerned with the issue of reliance than with the authority of the promisor,
have ordered specific performance of promises found to have been relied upon by the defen-
dant in entering his guilty plea. See, e.g., White v. Gaffney, 435 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1970);
People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal. 2d 110, 403 P.2d 429, 45 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965).
11 The court used biting language in discussing the actions of the defendant and the prosecu-
tor:
A defendant .. .who has misled, or lied to the court, should not, at least on this
record, be heard to contend that his plea was induced by an off-the-record promise.
That defendant may have acted upon the advice of counsel, or with the connivance of
a prosecutor, should not alter the result. . . .That the prosecutor also misled or
perhaps even lied to the court is to be deplored, but, on this record, should be of no
help to defendant if only because it permits a connivance which is not tolerable.
35 N.Y.2d at 242, 318 N.E.2d at 794, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
70 The court remarked that:
On oral argument in this court, the District Attorney urged that the underlying evi-
dence for the charge made it extremely doubtful that defendant could have been
convicted on trial. Indeed, defendant, despite his record, may have been innocent of
any wrongdoing on this charge. Postconviction procedures are, however, available to
correct any injustice, without undoing what is good in plea-taking practice, and in any
such proceeding defendant would not be barred from showing, among other possibili-
ties, that in the off-the-record plea negotiations he was misled into not protesting his
innocence. At such stage of the matter defendant may be entitled to go free for inno-
cence and not because of a shared deception on the court at plea taking.
Id. at 243, 318 N.E.2d at 794, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (emphasis added).
It is conceivable that the court was more concerned with the integrity of the process than
with the disposition of Campbell's appeal. Arguably, had the Court of Appeals granted the
various defendants' requests, it would have defeated the primary purpose of plea bargaining,
viz., easing the overburdened court calendars. By limiting review of guilty pleas to appeals
of final judgments of conviction, the court appears to be safeguarding against the burden
imposed by a series of collateral attacks on every plea bargain.
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mit a contradiction of the unambiguous record to enter into this individual
appeal of a plea bargain.
People v. Davidson
The issue of the inviolability of the record also arose in the disposition
of Davidson's appeal. Although the record of proceedings in the lower court
clearly indicated that he was to receive a sentence of from 3 to 10 years,
defendant Davidson alleged that, off-the-record, the judge had promised
him a 4-year maximum sentence. Curiously, the defendant did not raise
the issue of the broken "promise" until well after the sentence as recorded
was imposed-and after the sentencing judge had died.
Since the pleading, as recorded, indicated that Davidson denied the
existence of any promises, the court of appeals refused to give credence to
the defendant's claim. Furthermore, the Selikoff court explained that even
if Davidson's allegation of an off-the-record promise by a now deceased
judge had "some scintilla of credibility,"'" they would refuse to give it
judicial cognizance. The desirability of placing the entire plea negotiation
process on the record, the court continued, far outweighed the negative
effect of honoring a "promise" not found on that record.7"
A CRITICAL EVALUATION
With Selikoff has come the awareness that the courts must assume an
important role in protecting both the rights of plea bargaining defendants
and the integrity of the criminal justice system. As a result of Selikoif, all
pleading courts in New York are now required to make a detailed record
of the pleadings 3 and the judicial role in plea bargaining, often maligned,7"
has been reaffirmed. Nonetheless, not all the questions surrounding plea
bargaining have been resolved by the Selikoif opinion.
While encouraging a recorded interrogation of the defendant and the
prosecutor as to the nature, basis, understanding, and voluntariness of the
plea," the Selikoff opinion offers no assurances of a truthful response to
such an inquiry. In fact, in People v. Nixon,"6 Judge Breitel, the author of
the Selikoif opinion, had earlier indicated that "there is reason to suspect
that many pleading defendants are prepared to give the categorical an-
swers only because they know that this is the route to eligibility for the
1, Id. at 244, 318 N.E.2d at 795, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
72 Id.
" See Goldfluss, supra note 7, at 4, col. 6 n.2.
" See note 87 infra.
" The Supreme Court has required such a catechism before a plea can be accepted. See North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
76 21 N.Y.2d 338, 234 N.E.2d 687, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969).
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lesser plea."" A New York legislative study of prisoners convicted as a
result of guilty pleas significantly revealed that 91 percent of those sur-
veyed answered "no" when the sentencing judge asked if they were induced
by any promise or commitments-even though this was precisely the rea-
son for their plea."8 Additionally, the record alone would never reflect the
motives of either the prosecutor or the accused when entering into plea
discussions,79 let alone reveal the steps taken to secure the final bargain.
Of further concern is the court's apparent modification of the
Santobello decision's emphasis on the issue of reliance. While Santobello
recognized the importance of an accused's reliance upon a promise, s°
Selikoff seems to indicate that reliance would be virtually impossible since
every promise is either expressly or impliedly conditional.8 ' Defendants are
already faced with a series of uncertainties and pressures when they begin
to negotiate a plea. 2 Fear of the unreliability of a promise should not be
added to their concerns.
As one commentator has already noted, "complete reform of the plea
bargaining process must inevitably await the complete abolition of plea
bargaining." 3 Yet, in the absence of any other viable alternative to un-
manageable court calendars and already overcrowded detention facilities,
it appears that improvement rather than rejection of the plea bargaining
process should be the immediate objective of the criminal justice system.
Because it failed to recognize that meaningful reform must proceed
from legitimized judicial participation in the actual negotiation of the
guilty plea itself, it is submitted that Selikoff simply did not go far enough
in its attempt to regulate plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is not a test of
strength between opposing forces. It is a vital component of criminal adju-
dication and, as such, should be supervised by the bench in all its phases.
As discussed earlier,84 prosecutors have long enjoyed comparatively unfet-
tered discretion in the plea bargaining process. The disparity in effective-
ness among criminal defense attorneys, 5 coupled with prosecutorial discre-
tion, may all too often subvert the criminal justice system's search for
truth and justice. Rather than permit the accused and the prosecutor to
begin negotiations outside of his presence, the judge should be included in
77 Id. at 355, 234 N.E.2d at 697, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
' 1972-73 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SELECT COMM. ON CRIME, ITS CAUSES, CONTROL &
EFFECT ON SociETY 18.
7' See notes 32-42 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying note 58 and note 68 supra.
8, See text accompanying note 53 supra.
" See notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra.
13 Restructuring the Plea Bargain, supra note 33, at 312.
" See notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 56-57 (prosecutorial tactics vary with experience of defense
counsel); Restructuring the Plea Bargain, supra note 33, at 295 (public defenders often more
concerned with administrative burden of total caseload than individual defendant, whereas
private counsel free to use wider array of bargaining tactics).
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any and all discussions concerning the disposition of the charges against a
defendant. Not only would prosecutors thereby be deterred from over-
charging, but judicial involvement in the negotiation stage would serve to
eliminate their advantage as the sole arbiter of their case.
Judicial participation would encourage an early determination of the
factual basis for the accusatory instruments as well as the criminal culpa-
bility of the defendant. Thus, upon entry of a guilty plea, the defendant's
fear that he has bargained away his rights for unsupportable charges would
be mollified. Moreover, the prosecutor would no longer be permitted to
wave the carrot of concessions without first establishing a rational starting
point for any eventual "bargain.""6 Mandating that all negotiations be
conducted on the record and in the presence of a judge would severely limit
the possibilities of collateral attacks on the plea bargain. The existence of
an off-the-record promise, inducement, or implied condition must be made
literally impossible. As a result, promises would never be broken since all
promises would be either expressly conditional or clearly capable of being
fulfilled.
Admittedly, active judicial participation in plea bargaining has been
vehemently opposed on the ground that it would add to the inherent coer-
cion already present in the plea bargaining process."1 Such critics, however,
fail to recognize that judicial involvement, like plea bargaining, exists.
Prior to the Selikoff decision, New York judges regularly participated in
plea bargaining."8 Indeed, it is conceivable that Judge Burchell himself
played a role in the entry of Selikoff's plea.8 The issue is not whether a
judge should be involved in plea bargaining, but rather, where in the
process should his presence be first felt? It is submitted, then, that judicial
involvement in a plea conference would mitigate rather than aggravate
coercion by severely limiting the prosecutor's tactics.
The participating judge can conscientiously and openly protect a de-
fendant's rights rather than rely upon an ex post facto examination of the
negotiation process. Admittedly, judicial participation can be a source of
abuse if criminal court judges do not remain neutral and use their posi-
tion to unduly influence plea negotiations. The use of the record, how-
ever, would make any such intrusion into the plea conference both identi-
fiable and controllable. Such legitimized participation by the bench may
U The presence of a judge at the initial plea conference would prevent the prosecution from
inducing a plea by confronting the defendant with suppressible evidence, and offering as a
"concession" the dropping of unsupportable charges.
" See Gallagher, supra note 9; ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNC-
TION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 4.1 (1972); Official Inducements to Plead Guilty, supra note 39,
at 187.
" See White, supra note 5, at 448; note 14 supra.
S" See note 48 supra. It would appear that as a participant in numerous conferences Judge
Burchell either offered or approved the recommended sentence of no incarceration and a
possible fine.
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also help ease the burden on the courts since, as one judge has noted,
the logjam is largely prompted by the sense of uncertainty as to the ultimate
disposition which preoccupies an accused and his counsel. . . . Judicial in-
volvement in plea discussions tends to remove this cloak of uncertainty and
in turn, prompts the timely entering of a plea of guilty."
In short, it is submitted that Selikoff's goal of regulating the plea bargain-
ing process through judicial review and use of the record will not be effec-
tively realized until the judge becomes a regular part of the plea discussion,
with the record reflecting the negotiations as well as the results of the plea
conference.
CONCLUSION
No sympathy need be extended to Selikoff, Campbell, and Davidson
in their individual capacities as defendants. Campbell, a man well-versed
in the criminal process,"1 should have realized or did realize that the prose-
cutor had no power to authorize withdrawal of a guilty plea. Perhaps
Selikoff did in fact withhold information at his arraignment and was subse-
quently "found out." Davidson's allegation of an off-the-record promise by
the judge did not contain a "scintilla of credibility" and was simply not
to be believed. 2
Legitimizing the role of the court in all stages of the plea bargaining
process, however, would help to insure that defendants less well-versed
than Campbell would receive a promise from one upon whom he could
rely-a judge-and would not be penalized for any lack of experience. An
accused in Selikoff's position would at the outset receive a clear and unam-
biguous promise from a judge in return for whatever information was freely
communicated and verified. Not only would a defendant with a less
incredible story than Davidson find any formal promise clearly on the
record, but every element of the negotiation, any utterance which could be
construed as a promise, would appear on the record as well. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, plea bargaining would more closely resemble a rational
adjudication rather than an object of scorn and distrust.
The Selikoff decision is only an initial step in the right direction.
Judicial participation in the negotiation process is no panacea; yet, coup-
led with procedural safeguards and administrative commitment, it is a
beginning. 93 Continued efforts must be made to forge a rational link be-
Lambros, Plea Bargaining and the Sentencing Process, 53 F.R.D. 509, 519 (1971).
, When imposing the three-month sentence on Campbell, the court took notice of his "exten-
sive criminal narcotics record, consisting of 27 arrests or convictions." 35 N.Y.2d at 236, 318
N.E.2d at 790, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
" Id. at 244, 318 N.E.2d at 795, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
" For one commentator's detailed example of a proper balance between judicial involvement
and procedural safeguards see Restructuring the Plea Bargain, supra note 33, at 299-312.
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tween the sentencing discretion of the judge and the interests of expe-
diency, the rights of the defendant and the ends of justice. In this way, the
negotiated entry of a guilty plea, so prevalent in our current system of
justice, can resemble a "bargain" for all participants.

